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LAW ENFORCEMENT IN COLONIAL NEW YORK:
A REVIEW*

Albert ]. Harno t

T

HIS book is a landmark in American legal history. Legal scholars
have long lamented the fact that there was no authoritative work
on colonial law. Historians have, to be sure, taken excursions into the
field, but for the most part this, until the study here reviewed, was virgin t~rritory. The undertaking called for more than the gifts of a
historian. It demanded the talents and insight of a legal historian. The
authors are legal historians. Professor Goebel particularly is a wellknown figure in the field of legal history. The study covers a limited
field; it is restricted to criminal procedure in colonial New York.
The authors point out in the foreword that "the hand of time has
not dealt gently with our colonial records." War, fire, and indifferent
custodianship have each played a part in depleting source materials.
Nevertheless they have managed to round out an account that is wellnigh complete. The history of colonial New York begins with the
Dutch occupation. The work touches that period, but Dutch law is discussed only at points that bear on the main development of the study.
The task of the reviewer of this book is a difficult one. He might
restrict his account to a few general impressions, but these in no way
could convey a fair appraisal of a work, one of the main characteristics
of which is its faithfulness to detail. The study carefully sets out the
steps through which criminal procedures were transplanted from the
homeland to colonial New York and describes with equal fidelity their
growth and development in this new environment. It must not be
taken, however, that the work is dry and uninteresting. It contains
minutiae, almost to a fault, but it is livened with sparkling passages
which convey vivid impressions.
One of the main theses of the book, which is expressed repeatedly
and which finds ample support in its detailed accounts of the procedures
employed in the colony, is that there was no abrupt transition in the
laws of New York after the Revolution. No new legal system sprang
suddenly into being with that event. The people of New York in all
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matters legal went on as they had in colonial days, excepting only that
they never again proceeded in the name of the king. Independence had
nqt yet been won when in 1777 they "resolved as a part of their constitution that the acts of the provincial legislature, and such parts of the
common law and statutes of England and Great Britain as 'together
did form the law of the ... colony' on the day of the battle of Lexington, were to be the law bf the new state." 1 The colonists had worked
intently for oyer a century in the construction of a legal edifice. Their
concern after the Revolution was to preserve what they had so laboriously erected.
.
.
It is the fashion nowadays to disparage the common law. Perhaps
it is .a bit too slow-moving and too weighted 1with the impedimenta of
a bygone era for a complex and fast-moving civilization. But let it be
said, and may we ever remember, that the liberties which are essential
to a free society were fashioned and welded in the heat of the forge of
the common law. True, the common law was contentious, but contention is the sine qua non of the establishment and maintenance of civil
rights. It is noteworthy that the settlers of New York from the earliest
'days were insistent on having the benefits of the procedures and civil
rights afforded by the common law. The marshalled materials of this
book bear eloquent testimony to this observation: The significant fact
, is that, "although nearly every royal act and every instrument upon
which jurisdiction in the colony was founded at one time or another
were subjected to attack by the colonists, the common law itself as a
source of authority was never challenged but, on the contrary, was regarded as the shield and buckler of constitutional right." 2
The first English governor of New York was Colonel Richard
Nicolls, whose period of office began in 1664. The earliest instrument
dealing with the governance of the colony was the royal charter to
James, Duke of York. The charter centered all legislative, executive,
and judicial control in the hands of the proprietor, with the limitations
that the duke was subject to the crown's appellate supervision and to
the necessity of conforming as nearly as possible to English law. There
followed a period of adaptation of the practices of the English inferior
courts. "The consequence was that what was erected in New York was
nostalgic of memories of old England, for it was indeed a creation of
memory and not of exact knowledge." 11
What might be described as the formative era for the laws of New
1
2
3

Introduction, p. xvii.
P. 57. See additional expressions on this subject, pp. 325, 326.

P. 16.
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York began with the governorship of Thomas Dongan in I 68 3. Immediately upon his accession, an elected assembly enacted a new judicature
law which recast the procedural devices of the colony by introducing the
English indictment and English process and forms of recordation.
"Once common law forms become seated, the second stage of reception
passes into a phase that may be described as one of selective reproduction of English legal institutions at large. Thi~ is essentially a process
of imitation, quickened from time to time by the arrival of able craftsmen-the judge Mompesson, the lawyers Alexander, Murray and
Smith, and the two Attorneys General, William and John Tabor
Kempe." 4 But while it is eminently descriptive of the procedures
adopted in the colony to say that they were an imitation _of the old
world, it must also be recognized that, with the installation of these
procedures over here, they took on a new identity in their new environment.
The sources of jurisdiction in the administration of the province
were complicated. Mention has been made of the charter to the Duke of
York. The major points of crown policy were couched in commissions
and general instructions. These emanated from the governor and the
council, which was a microcosmic copy of the king and the privy council, and were exercised by ordinances. The governor possessed also the
power of proclamation. Another source of authority that a:ffected the
lives of the inhabitants, as did the acts of the assembly and the ordinances of the governor and the council, was local enactment. The mayor
and aldermen, sitting as a common council, had the power to pass
ordinances which had the force of law for a few months and which
became permanent on confirmation of the governor. In the counties the
Courts of General Sessions made regulations.
In I 69 I the assembly ·enacted a judicature act which created sessions similar to the Quarter Sessions of England and a Supreme Court
of Judicature, which was the keystone of the judicial system of the
colony. This court was endowed with the powers of the King's Bench,
Common Bench and Exchequer. It held a position of supremacy in the
judicial system that was greater in fact than that of the King's Bench in
4

Introduction, p. xxv.
"In the capital were congregated the most skillful lawyers, and from the beginning of the eighteenth century onwafd, these courts were peopled by men who had legal
training. These urban sources standing alone are traverse enough of the stuff propagated
as American legll;l history. They reveal that in one outpost of Europe litigation was
conducted as skillfully as at York or Bristol, and that the picture of an oafish frontier
jurisprudence is a mirage of writers who have never blown the dust from indictment,
pleading or judgment roll." Introduction, p. xxvi.
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England, since the possibility, of a review of its decisions was very restricted.
High tribute is due the courts of the province. The attentive reader
of this book will find in it ample evidence of the imperative necessity of
a strong and independent judiciary, for only through the officers of a
court so endowed can human rights be defined and preserved. In provincial New York the struggle over jurisdiction, the authors point out,
"revolved about the warring theories of Crown and colonists--on the
one hand a policy of_ close control and centralized administration, on the
other a strong predilection for local autonomy and decentralization. It
was in disputes over tq.e law and legal institutions that resentment was
nurtured against what were conceived to be the oppressions and injustices of royal officials. It was in the courts that the colonists were indoctrinated to revolution." 5 The Supreme Court of provincial New
York consistently refused to give ear to challenges of its jurisdiction.
Its primacy was achieved by the "constancy with which it superintended
the inferior common law courts and by the diligent husbanding of the
generous endowment of jurisdiction conveyed to it by ordinance and
statute." 6
A provincial act passed in 1741 gave the j~dges of the supreme
court nisi prius jurisdiction ex officio. The supervisory powers of the
court over inferior courts extended beyond the jurisdicdon exercised at
bar and through nisi prius, since under a provincial act passed in 1692,
one or more of the judges were required to "'go the circuit and hold
and keep the Supreme Court for the several counties.'" 7 Under this
program a member of the court "came down annually on circuit, with
the hardier members of the bar at his heels, and at a Court of Oyer and
Terminer and General Gaol Delivery and a Court of Causes brought to
"
Issue in the Supreme Court gave
demonstration of the metropolitan
8
way." Thus the finger of the central authority was kept upon the local
courts. For proceedings which were not rightly handled at sessions,
there was the writ of certiorari, and for foolish, incompetent or knavish
officials there were the information, the attachment of contempt, or the
governor's power of removal. As ari adjunct to the annual visits of the
circuit court, special commissions were employed to try cases. Down
the scale of jurisdiction there were Courts of General Sessions kept by a
small army of justices of the peace, empowered to hear and determine
cases involving minor crimes.9
5

P. I.
8
Introduction, p. xxvii.

6

P. 3II.

•

9

Pp. 90, 91.

7

P. So. See also p. 74.
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In the initiation of proceedings, accusation by a grand jury was
commonly employed in the prosecution of persons suspected of felonies
and of the more serious misdemeanors. This was not the sole means of
beginning prosecutions, for in cases in which "the Crown had some
particular stake, or where there was reason to suppose an indictment
would not be returned, there was the alternative of an information
brought by the Attorney General." 10 This officer, in fact, made frequent resort to this method of accusation, which practice eventually became a source of considerable irritation to the colonists.
Two types of informations were used-those in the name of the
king and those at the suit of an informer. The crown's information was
employed as a means of securing a criminal sanction for violation of the
king's rights, and it became a most effective weapon. Ther:e seems to
have been nothing inherently unfair in the pi:ocedure, but it inevitably
was associated in the colonists' minds with the suppression of those activities by which they attempted to promote their liberties. This feeling
resulted in the passage in I 72 7 of a provincial act which required that
all pending informations be quashed and which prohibited the exhibition of any information in the future except by order of the governor
and signed by the council. It is interesting to observe, however, that
although the colonists objected to the king's information, they made no
objection to the deprivations effected by common law summary proceedings employed in dealing with a variety of petty misdemeanors.11
While summary procedures were commonly resorted to in minor
offenses, a petit jury was invariably employed in felony cases and in
misdemeanors prosecuted by information or indictment in which the
defendant pleaded the general issue.~2 In all criminal trials common
law practices prevailed. According to the authors, it is possible to plot
the course of a typical criminal trial of the Eighteenth Century with the
Office of the Clerk of Assize or the Crown Circuit Compamon in one
hand and Hawkins' Pleas of the Crown, in the other.18
In the development of appellate procedures, the colonists lagged
behind the advances made in the mother country, inconsiderable though
these were. The study records just two clear instances where motions
in arrest of judgment were employed in the sessions courts and states
that only occasionally was resort made to them in the supreme court.14
10

11
P. 337·
Pp. 370, 373, 379•
Pp. 603, 609.
18
Pp. 558, 573. The book does not gloss over miscarriages of justice. Observe the
references to King v. Leisler et al., pp. 83, 582-583.
14
Pp. 277, 278.
12
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Only one case is mentioned in which a motion for a ne~ trial was made.
This neglect of appellate review may be attributed in part to the fact
that the colonists had developed an elaborate system of transfer jurisdiction which tended to eliminate the opportunity for review, and in
part to the restricted role played by counsel in criminal cases. Only
with respect to certiorari did the provincial bar exhibit a disposition to
indulge in experimentation.15
From the point of view of the individual and his rights, the matter
of process lies at the core of all procedure. In the colonial period, the
term "due process" had not yet taken on a magic meaning, but it was
during the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, which centuries also
mark the colonial era in America, that many of the rights that have
come to be covered by that expression were defined and established.
The words "due process" are given content and meaning only when
studied in the light of the growth and development of common law
precepts. We hear mention today of the "American heritage." The
foundation for the American heritage was· laid in colonial America
through tlie insistence of the colonists on their rights. "And should
contemporary judicial distaste for 'substantive' due process become
more pronounced, it will be prudent for the citizen to have at hand
the record of the procedural expectations of his ancestors who made the
phrase 'due process' immortal in our constitutions." 16_
Colonial practice as ·to punishment was built on English practice
with all of its harshness and measures of compassion. With respect to
felonies, the penalty was death. The ultimate mercy of the law for the
felon was the pardon, which appears' to have been employed not ungenerously. Where discretion was available in minor offenses, there
was merely a choice between bodiiy a:ffiiction and a fine. '
As an incident to punishment, the colonists made interesting use of
recognizance. In fact, the recognizance was widely employed as a de-:vice in aid of law enforcement. It was used as a measure to bind the
peace and good behavior. It appears to have been a boon to nervous
women. But in a broader application, security devices were used to
fortify and insure the progress of a trial at all points, from the arrest of
a defendant or the formulation of a charge against him down through
the finaf execution of sentence. In relation to punishment it came to be
used as a sort of parole device. This usage can be understood with
reference to the schedule of penalties and punishments employed in this
period. Imprisonment was primarily used as a means of custody pre1s

P. 284.
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liminary to trial; it was principally a phase of procedure rather than
of punishment. When a jail sentence was meted out, it was most often
ancillary; that is to say, it formed a part of a complex sentence composed of fine, pillory, or whipping,11 and sometimes security after the
punishment had been inflicted. The parole use of recognizance to secure good behavior after conviction was a logical extension of the
powers respecting sureties to keep the peace.
The authors are severe in their censure of other writers who have
ventured to make appraisals of colonial law.18 The Revolution successful, the post-Revolution judges, lawyers, and legal writers, under the
spell of Blackstone, Kent, and Story, passed by the readily accessible
colonial practice and turned for guides and precedents to English cases
and treatises. Observing this, some American writers have concluded
that for all practical purposes the history of American common law began after the Revolution. It is this inference that the authors heatedly
aim to refute. This book is a monument to the fact that the history of
American common law began in colonial America. Nevertheless, the
post-Revolution theory of conceptjon cannot summarily be ignored, for
it is true that Kent, Story, and an army of judges and lawyers, after
the Revolution, by-passed the colonial period and turned for source material to English law.
The book is a publication of the Foundation for Research in Legal
History, Columbia University School of Law. The work of 'this foundation is supported by the Commonwealth Fund.
17 "The cases on the permutations and combinations of punishment are interesting
and so far as any rule can be extracted it appears that if a sentence was very severe
corporal punishment no bond was exacted. Thus in 1727 David Wallace and David
Willson were convicted of a cheat in passing counterfeit bills, and it was ordered 'that
on Dec. I 2 ••• or, if foul weather, the next fair day thereafter the defendants shall
stand in the pillory for one hour.' They were then to be put in a cart and carted
with a halter on their necks and be so placed as to be publicly seen. Wallace was then
to get thirty-nine stripes and Willson twenty-eight. The sheriff of New York, having
seen execution done, was to deliver them to the sheriff of Kings County, where they
were to be imprisoned and pilloried an hour and Wallace was to get thirty-nine lashes,
Willson twenty-eight. They were then to be delivered to the sheriff of Queens where
the same punishment was to be meted out in Jamaica, and next they were to 'be sent to
Westchester County for the same punishment. Then they were to be returned to New
York where Wallace was to be imprisoned for six months and Willson for three months,
whereupon they were both to be discharged upon payment of their fees.
"It may be that the expectation of Wallace and Willson surviving was so slight no
bond was thought necessary." P. 5 I 5.
18
See Introduction, pp. xviii-xxxiii, and writers there cited.

/

